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 Abstract 
This thesis has sought to answer the question if Sweden is comparatively advantageous in the 
trade with emission allowances in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (EU ETS) in 2005-
2008.  
 
By analyzing the emission levels in the Swedish greenhouse gas abundant sectors and the 
compliance to the EU ETS, it was shown that Swedish production outperformed the emission 
targets every year studied, leaving a large amount of emission allowances to be sold. This is 
to a large extent due to the use of renewable sources of energy in the electricity and heating 
sectors which have also been especially targeted by government policies. It has also been 
shown that most Swedish industry sectors are competitively advantageous when the EU ETS 
is taken into account. These measurements imply that Sweden has successfully managed to 
become efficient in the use of greenhouse gases i.e. comparatively advantageous in trading 
emission allowances. However, when analyzing Nord Pool trade data there is a contradictory 
relationship showing that Sweden not only has a negative net trade flow; it has gone from 
being a net exporter to a net importer of emission allowances. The reason for the discrepancy 
in this thesis is thought to be that Swedish firms emit more greenhouse gases abroad than at 
home. This is due to a measurement mismatch in the definition of Sweden. 
 
This thesis could therefore not conclusively answer whether Sweden is comparatively 
advantageous or not. 
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 1 Introduction 
In 1997 a majority of the countries in the world signed the international treaty to be known as 
the Kyoto protocol. This was the start of a new era in international environmental politics to 
fight the growing problem of global warming. The intent of the protocol is to limit and 
reduce the amount of atmospheric greenhouse gases (GHG) in a period of 20 years based on 
the amount of emissions in 1990. During this time period the emissions of green house gases 
would be cut with a total of five per cents. The protocol, which mainly targets carbon 
dioxide, also states by which methods this can be achieved where market based initiatives 
(MBI) is a central theme. 
 
There have been a variety of approaches to the inclusion of the negative externality of GHGs 
during the years where the most commonly used tool has been a carbon dioxide (CO2) tax. 
This is still a common instrument, but during the last decades the fairly new cap and trade 
system has been more frequently favoured. This system, which was first suggested in 1966 
by the economist T D Crocker, is designed to put the market at the centre of attention. It was 
first implemented on a larger scale when the acid rain program in USA was launched. By 
capping the total amount of acid rain inducing components allowed and letting the market by 
trading allowances decide where these were most efficiently reduced, the phenomenon of 
acid rain effectively decreased. A similar system is now used on an even larger scale in the 
EU in order to reduce the amount of GHGs emitted and to meet the Kyoto emission targets. 
 
The EU cap and trade system is called the EU Emissions trading scheme (EU ETS). It covers 
a total of 30 countries and almost 2000 million tonne of GHGs. This system has successfully 
managed to collect the members under a united environmental policy for the European 
community, by implementing a common regulatory framework for all to comply. With a 
single market for emissions of GHGs differences between countries in production, 
technology and development therefore becomes increasingly clear and interesting to study. 
This thesis takes on one part of studying such differences. It takes on the case of Sweden. 
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 1.1 Problem and hypothesis 
The purpose of this thesis is to analyze if Sweden is a comparatively advantageous country in 
trading emission allowances. In order to determine this, a number of variables will be taken 
into account. First off, the division of emissions by sector and the total Swedish compliance 
will be analyzed. Further on, the competitiveness of Swedish firms within the scheme and the 
policy implications of the allocation of allowances by Swedish authorities will also be 
analyzed. These measurements will present if such a prerequisite exists. Lastly, trade data will 
be processed to ascertain if Swedish trade reflects such an assumption. More explicitly the 
question is. 
 
• Is Sweden comparatively advantageous in trading emission allowances in the EU 
ETS? 
 
The hypothesis is that Sweden has a comparative advantage. This would mean that Swedish 
installations emit less GHGs than allowed thus leaving an excess of emission allowances 
unused. These are most likely sold in order to gain profit i.e. appearing as positive net trade 
in trade data. 
1.2 Delimitations 
The main limitation of the study is the analysis of Sweden in the EU ETS. The trading 
mechanisms of the Kyoto protocol will not explicitly be included, though they are hard to 
completely exclude since the systems are intertwined in many ways. It is mainly the tradable 
allowances issued by the Kyoto protocol that overlap the European scheme that become 
troublesome, but the other compliance variables are easier to isolate.  
 
This thesis will not make any attempt to discuss the legality of the EU cap and trade system. 
Some efficiency measures of the scheme, mainly the pricing of allowances, will be discussed 
but the intent is not to further question the mechanisms of the EU ETS. Also, the existence of 
the greenhouse effect will not be questioned. 
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 1.3 Disposition 
The thesis is divided into six main chapters. These are outlined to make it as easy as possible 
for the reader to follow. This introduction, chapter one, is followed by a background to the 
study. This chapter will present the Kyoto protocol, the cap and trade system which is the 
basis for the system and of course the EU ETS system itself. It also includes a presentation of 
what previous research has been concentrated on. The third chapter will give a brief 
theoretical discussion about the externalities of environmental costs and comparative 
advantages. The analysis of the empirical material will be presented in the fourth chapter. 
This will be introduced by an in depth review of the hypothesis followed by the methodology 
that will explain how the material is processed. This is followed by the variables needed to 
answer the question. The fifth chapter will discuss the empirical analysis in contrast to the 
question and the hypothesis leading up to the sixth chapter which concludes the thesis. 
Abbreviations and a list of exhibits are presented separately and references are found in 
chapter seven. 
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 2 Background 
This chapter will present the background to this thesis by explaining the Kyoto protocol, the 
cap and trade system and the European Union emissions trading scheme. This chapter will 
give the reader an understanding of the mechanisms of the EU ETS. 
2.1 The Kyoto protocol 
The well known Kyoto protocol was the result of the 1997 international climate change 
summit in Kyoto, Japan. This protocol became an extension of the United Nations 
framework convention on climate change (UNFCCC), the difference being that the UNFCCC 
is a voluntary agreement, while the Kyoto protocol is a binding commitment to agreed levels 
of emissions reduction. The intentions of the two entities are however the same; to ‘stabilize 
atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases (GHGs) at a level that will prevent dangerous 
interference with the climate system’ (Kyoto protocol reference manual: sid. 12, 2008).  
 
The Kyoto protocols main intention is to reduce GHG emissions to the 1992 levels. Due to 
differences in countries absolute and relative levels of emissions, the maximum level allowed 
differs between countries. Worth mentioning is that, even though a majority of the world’s 
countries has signed the treaty not all are included in the limitations. Excluded are first and 
foremost developing and newly industrialized countries (Kyoto protocol reference manual, 
2008:13). There are about 40 countries that are limited in emissions by the treaty called the 
annex 1 countries. These are divided into eight subgroups depending on the percentage 
amount of reduction or allowed increase. These groups vary in levels ranging from – 8 % to 
+ 10 %. 
 
Moreover this, there are a variety of other limitations in the agreement. One of these is the 
Land use, land use change and forestry (LULUCF) which regulates the human induced 
alterations in the usage of land causing changes in a country’s GHG inventory (unfccc.int, 
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 2009). Since GHGs, mainly carbon dioxide, isn’t just about the emissions but also the 
absorption. The natural cycle in the exchange of oxygen and carbon dioxide with plants is 
well known, thus the lack of CO2 absorption is becomes a vital part of the greenhouse effect. 
The LULUCF article in the Kyoto protocol mainly focuses on forestry issues such as human 
induced afforestation, deforestation and reforestation, but also crop management and other 
kinds of commercial land use. Forestation must be accounted for by the annex 1 countries 
when reporting to the UNFCCC (Kyoto protocol reference manual, 2008: 14-15). If there are 
changes in a country’s amount of forestation this will be reflected in the emission targets 
reported (ibid.). 
 
That what makes the Kyoto protocol especially interesting is in what way emission 
reductions can be achieved. This protocol namely introduced trade mechanisms as a tool to 
reduce GHG emissions. The system itself is not that different from the EU ETS albeit 
positioned on a global scale. Allowances are issued to countries that engage in GHG 
reducing technology in another country. These allowances can be used to reach the Kyoto 
targets or they can be sold at market prices (Kyoto protocol reference manual, 2008: 16). The 
main difference between the EU ETS system and the Kyoto protocol is that the first 
mentioned covers basically all commercial GHG emissions which is not the case with the 
Kyoto protocol. Further on, a country cannot only buy units to cover excess GHG emissions 
without themselves introducing GHG reducing actions; this is a prerequisite. These units are 
therefore more of a complement by which obtaining the goals are made possible for parties 
that otherwise wouldn’t.  
 
The Kyoto units are also valid within the EU ETS system and are tradable in the same way as 
the EU ETS units. Even though the protocol does not address any regional trading system 
specifically it works like an umbrella under which the mechanisms can be connected. It is 
therefore possible to establish a regional trading scheme with the commitments to the Kyoto 
protocol (Kyoto protocol reference manual, 2008:16). 
 
There are two kinds of Kyoto unit’s traded, Joint Implementation (JI) and the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM). They can be traded in the same way but are awarded by 
different requirements. The first kind of unit programme, Joint Implementation, is based on 
the internationalization between countries. This is rewarded if an annex 1 country invests in 
GHG reducing activities in another annex 1 country; such units are called Emission 
 7
 Reduction Units (ERU) (Kyoto protocol reference manual, 2008:17). This kind of unit is 
basically just a transfer of emission reductions between annex 1 countries since they don’t 
reduce the total amount of emissions within the annex 1 countries. For this reason ERUs are 
not viable in the EU ETS. The second Kyoto unit programme, Clean Development 
Mechanism, works just like the JI units but with one difference. Like JI units an annex 1 
country can obtain these by investing in GHG reducing activities in a second country (Kyoto 
protocol reference manual, 2008:17). The difference is that these are awarded when such 
activities are implemented in a non annex 1 country (ibid.). This also means that the total 
amount of emissions within the annex 1 countries is allowed to increase while the total 
amount of emissions worldwide stays the same. When traded, these units are called Certified 
Emission Reductions (CER) (ibid.). CERs are allowed to be used within the EU ETS and are 
worth the same amount of emissions as EU ETS units, one tonne of GHG per allowance. 
2.2 Cap and trade 
The cap and trade system is the main MBI tool used to combat global climate change. By 
implementing a cap on the total amount of emissions allowed, the market is free to trade the 
right to emit GHGs in between each other. The fundamental theory is that the market itself is 
the best regulator in the dispersion of the economic impact.  
 
Before these market based initiatives were introduced the more commonly used regulation 
was command and control. This phrase includes a variety of tools to regulate 
environmentally negative externalities such as taxation, quotas or legal control. Though 
causing a similar effect on the environmental impact, it has been shown that these methods 
are far from economically efficient because of the fixed design (Stavins, 2007). Command 
and control measures instead tend to cause firms to take on similar shares of the pollution 
though these aren’t uniform in size, technology or performance (ibid.). This means that the 
economic impact differs between firms.  
 
The MBI presents itself as an alternative that uses the market as the base of the system. This 
was a different approach by which environmental goals could be achieved by untraditional 
methods (Burtraw and Evans, 2009). The cap and trade is as an incentive-based market 
orientated system where individual firms have a greater control over their emissions and 
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 environmental goals. It is well suited for markets where firms are differentiated in 
production, size, technological progress and location (ibid.) 
 
The system is carried out by introducing a ceiling in the amount of emissions allowed during 
a certain time. This is possible by creating a limited amount of rights to emit GHGs. These 
rights, or allowances, are then either given or auctioned out to firms that use GHGs in their 
production. The firms are then free to trade the allowances in between each other as they see 
fit. However, the firms always have to hold as many allowances as is needed to cover their 
emissions. If these firms own more allowances than they need they can sell them at market 
price, but if they have too few they need to buy a corresponding amount of allowances to 
cover all of their emissions. If a firm possesses fewer allowances than emitted GHGs they 
will be fined for the transgressed amount of emissions. In this way the allowances are 
allocated socio-economically cost efficient and the regulator does not need to take into 
account every firms cost functions or their level of technology, because the individual firm 
will find the best production option that minimizes their costs (Burtraw and Evans, 2009). By 
extension their new cost function will represent one part of the total socio-economic cost 
function set by the cap (ibid.). 
 
More over this, the system also presents an incentive to reduce emissions. By investing in 
emission reducing technology, firms can effectively lower their costs. It gives firms the 
control of their own externalities. 
2.2.1 Allocation principles in the cap and trade system 
An important part of the Cap and trade system is in what way the allowances are distributed. 
There are two main policies in this matter, handout or auction. The choice between the two 
has been a source of a great deal of discussions within economic literature. The handout 
model is also called grandfathering and means that the initial distribution of the emission 
allowances are allocated for free. There are mainly two reasons for doing so, to ease firms 
into the cap and trade system and to avoid additional restraint on consumer prices. However, 
it also causes some difficulties in the distribution of the allowances. Since all firms would 
like as many allowances as possible, the allocation can become rather problematic. Even if 
this process is based on objective measurements like previous emissions, expected future 
emissions, benchmark models or even politics, it has been shown that rent seeking behavior 
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 plays a certain role in such allocation (Burtraw and Evans, 2009). Other distorting effects are 
the uneven allocation to new entrants based on benchmark models and windfall profits. The 
reason for windfall profits to arise is the tendency shown in some markets where firms pass 
on the fictitious cost of allowances to the consumer. This causes consumer prices to rise 
while companies make more profit even though the allowances were given for free (Sepibus, 
2007). In order to minimize the effects of rent seeking behavior and windfall profits, the cap 
and the allocation of allowances must be set in an efficient manner.  
 
The second approach to the distribution of emission allowances is the auctioning system. 
This kind of allocation is a lot simpler in design and is also favored in economic literature. 
Without any preparatory work in allocation plans, all allowances are auctioned out to firms at 
market price. This minimizes the risk of rent seeking behavior and windfall profits but causes 
consumer prices to rise as production marginal costs increase. There is also a difference in 
the incentives. In a hand out distribution there is the possibility of making profit if 
environmentally sound technological changes are made, although an auction conveys a 
message that these changes are necessary to maintain a competitive edge in the marketplace 
through the threat of increasing costs. 
2.3 The European Emissions Trading Scheme 
The 13th October 2003 was the day the European parliament agreed to adopt the EU council 
directive 2003/87/EG which included a new approach to the ratification of the Kyoto 
protocol. This directive introduced a cap and trade system to reduce the amount of 
greenhouse gases emitted within the EU. The intention was to comply with the Kyoto 
protocol in a cost effective and economically viable way. It was calculated by the EU 
Commission that the system would lower the public cost by 35 percent as opposed to letting 
member states individually reduce GHG-emissions (naturvardsverket.se, 2007). In addition 
to carbon dioxide the directive also included the GHGs methane, nitrous oxide, hafnium 
carbide, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluorides (European Parliament, 2003).  
 
The system mainly targets the industries using greenhouse gases intensively as by-products 
in production. Individuals and households are completely exempted along with some 
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 industries such as transportation and aviation. Other exemptions are plants or parts of plants 
used for research and development and facilities used for testing new products and processes 
(ibid). However, the intent is to include more sectors as the system progresses. 
 
The EU ETS works just as described in the cap and trade part above. The EU commission 
sets the cap on the total amount emissions allowed within the scheme and issues the 
corresponding amount of allowances. The distribution of allowances is carried out by a 
handout process, also described above, where the appropriate authorities in every country 
allocate the allowances according to guidelines set out by the commission. The Swedish 
agency in charge of the distribution process is the Environment Protection Agency (EPA) 
Naturvårdsverket. The intent is to use the grandfathering system during the first two phases 
and then swap the allocation approach to an auctioning system in 2013. 
 
Within the system, one allowance equals one tonne of GHG emissions. In order to assure 
compliance to the system, companies and other institutions covered are obliged to report the 
amount emitted once a year to the respective member state agency in charge of the emission 
rights distribution. If an installation exceeds their held amount of allowances in emissions at 
this time their infringement is to be set in an effective, proportional and deterring manner. 
The penalty in the second phase is €100 per excess tonne plus the cost of allowances needed 
(Daskalakis and Markellos, 2008). If installations were to emit less GHGs than allowances 
held these can, in addition to be sold, be banked for future periods (ibid.). 
 
There are two kinds of emission rights possible to use in the trading scheme, the EU 
allowance (EUA) and Certified emission reductions (CER). The first mentioned is the kind of 
allowance that is specific for the EU ETS, which can only be used within the system. The 
other kind, CERs, is used in the same as a EUA but is directly issued through the 
mechanisms in the Kyoto protocol, as previously mentioned. Every allowance has an 
expiration date depending on when they were issued. An allowance can be used in the year of 
the issuance or in years to come depending on this expiration. They can actually also be used 
for previous periods. If an installation exceeds their limitations of emissions one year they 
can cover these with allowances allocated in the following period (Stauffer, 2008). This way, 
the system remains flexible and limits the possibility to speculate in the markets. 
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 There are today five larger scale European market places for trading emission allowances. 
The London based European Climate Exchange (ECX), Nord Pool, which is particular large 
in the Nordic countries, the European Energy Exchange (EEX), the New York stock 
exchanges environmental branch Bluenext and the energy exchange of Austria (EXAA). 
These all offer trade with both EUAs and CERs. However, over the counter (OTC) trade is 
also a common trading route. OTC means that firms trade directly with each other without 
intermediaries (IETA report, 2007). When comparing the climate exchanges in size the ECX 
is the largest followed in falling order by Nord Pool, EEX, Bluenext and EXAA.  
 
The introduction of a common environmental policy in emissions was especially pushed onto 
the agenda by the northern European countries, including Sweden (Nello, 2005: 264). The 
reason for this was the existing differences in compliance cost to GHG polluting industries. 
After the implementations of the ‘single market program’ such differences in fiscal 
governing became incentives for reallocation of industries. Since the northern members of 
the EU had higher environmental compliance cost these feared they would be undermined in 
a race-to-the-bottom (ibid.). With a joint environmental program such fears would be 
uncalled for. 
2.3.1 EU ETS since 2005 
The EU ETS is currently in the second phase which will last until 2012. The first phase was 
initialized in January 2005 and ended in December 2007. The scheme currently includes 27 
countries. The introduction of the system ran smoothly and the price levels increased steadily 
from just over € 7 to over € 25 in the following 15 months (Nord Pool price index, 2005-
2007). However, in the end of April 2006 the price collapsed and halved in just a few days 
after it became clear that a majority of countries had over allocated allowances in the initial 
distribution (Entec, 2007); this caused the price to plummet rapidly. By the fall of 2006 one 
allowance could be bought for less than 10 € and in February they had fallen to just one cent 
(Nord Pool price index 2005-2007). This caused many to publicly criticize the EU ETS as 
being an ineffective tool in combating climate change. 
  
Preceding the second phase the system was made more stringent and more inclusive. There 
were three new countries included, Norway, Iceland and Lichtenstein (eubusiness.com, 
2007). This was an intentional effort of the EU commission to expand the scheme outside the 
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 union with the intent to globalize the cap and trade system (ibid.). The industries included at 
this point were first and foremost installations that previously had been exempted due to 
production differentiations.  
 
The second phase also introduced the possibility of expansions to include other industry 
sectors, mainly the aviation, maritime and forestry sectors (Dimas, 2005). The aviation 
industry alone is responsible for three percent of the EU total carbon dioxide emissions and 
has yet to invest in carbon dioxide efficient technology. This is also an expanding industry 
which makes it all the more important to include (ibid.) as with maritime transportation. 
Because of deforestation resulting in a lower natural absorption of atmospheric carbon 
dioxide the forestry sector was also considered a valued sector to include. These changes are 
expected to be implemented in 2012. There is also an intention of including the 
transportation sector in the third phase though there are problems with how to restrict what to 
include and exclude. 
 
Despite the fact that the new entrants of countries and sectors enlarged the scheme, these 
were rather small additions. The more pressing issue in entering the second phase was 
determining how to set the new cap.  
 
When entering the second phase of the scheme the EU commission showed an increased 
constraint on the cap of allowances issued. The main reason was that the first phase resulted 
in a 1.8 percent increase in emissions (European Union, 2008). Even though the EU GDP 
growth was 2.8 percent in 2007 alone, this was not an impressive result. The main constraint 
in entering the second phase was the reductions of allowances issued. The allocations in the 
first phase didn’t apply such constraints, instead confiding in the member states allocation 
plans to present a correct evaluation of emissions over the three years (ibid.). 
 
When assessing the allocation plans for the second phase the EU commission used a more 
stringent starting point. This comprised three main points that needed to be fulfilled. The first 
was that the allocation plans had to be consistent to the EU total and individual countries 
Kyoto commitments. The second was the consistency with actual emissions in the annual 
progress reports and the third was the consistency with the technological potential for 
emission reductions (European Union, 2007).  
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 2.4 Previous research 
Even though the EU ETS is rather young, combined with the fairly untested use of the cap 
and trade system, the scheme has already come to be well documented. There are some 
different approaches to the subject in the previous research. One of these is the studies of the 
allocation principles and the implications on competitiveness between industry sectors and 
countries. In the article, “The European emission trading scheme put to the test of state aid 
rules” de Sepibus (2007) discusses the compatibility of the allocation of allowances to the 
state aid rules implying competitive distortions in the electricity sector. In, “Strategic 
partitioning of emission allowances” Böhringer and Rosendahl (2008) analyzes the effects of 
strategic partitioning by the inclusion and exclusion of sectors to the scheme in compliance 
cost and emission prices. Further on, there has been some other research done in 
competitiveness effects to the system where the authors Sonja Peterson and Gernot Klepper 
(2008) have been especially active. These articles discuss differences in competitive 
advantage between sectors and regions when the EU ETS is taken into account. A number of 
studies have also been published on the price mechanisms in the spot markets (Benz and 
Trück, 2008) and what factors affect the pricing of EUAs (Aggeryd and Strömqvist, 2008). 
There are also some studies that have been made in the use of the cap and trade where the 
efficiency of such a system is analyzed by including the EU ETS, and in what manner the 
allocation of allowances is conducted (Burtraw and Evans, 2009). In the case of Sweden as a 
member country in the EU ETS the few articles that are published mostly deals with 
emission reduction possibilities in specific industries or installations. One report however 
investigates how the Swedish economy will be affected by the climate goals in the Kyoto 
protocol but only indirectly includes the EU ETS (Hill and Kriström, 2005). 
 
Although being a well studied area the aspect of the actual trade in emission allowances is 
not as well documented. The reason for this most likely lies in the secrecy when it comes to 
the amounts traded by specific actors. There have been unsuccessful attempts by news 
journalists (Hermansson, 2009), but none were found in scientific articles. 
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 3 Theoretical discussion 
This chapter will present a brief discussion on the theoretical framework to the question of 
this thesis. The intent is to offer the reader an understanding about the economic mechanisms 
surrounding the externality of pollution and choice of comparative advantage as a 
measurement. 
3.1 Negative externalities 
The phenomenon of global warming caused by the greenhouse effect is in economic theory a 
case of negative externalities. This means that there is a mismatch between private and social 
cost, specifically when a third party pays an excess cost not included in the production. It is 
this excess cost that is called a negative externality. By exemplifying this, if a firm produces 
a good with air pollutants as a by-product, such as GHGs, the private cost is the direct cost of 
producing that good. However, the social cost that presents itself as the negative effect on the 
surroundings, such as global warming, is not included in the production cost. In this way the 
firm does not carry the full cost of their production, leaving a negative external cost. The 
implication of this is that externalities cause the allocation of recourses to be inefficient. 
Since the market price does not reflect the total cost, neither producer nor consumer will pay 
full price for the product (Nicholson, 2005: 588). It is instead a third party that pays for the 
additional cost. In an unregulated market the assumption is that such additional cost will not 
be included in the price since both the producer and consumer (assumed rational) strive to 
minimize their cost leaving the market inefficient (fundamentalfinance.com, 2009). But, 
since society as a whole both benefits (lower cost) and loses from pollution, there is an 
optimal level where the marginal benefit and marginal cost intersects (Krugman and Wells, 
2005: 458). 
 
The most common solution to offset market inefficiencies is to place a market regulation. 
The optimal regulation would impose just the right amount of coercion to subdue dead 
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 weight welfare loss from arising (fundamentalfinance.com, 2009). A traditional way of 
regulating such markets is to impose a tax specifically known as a Pigovian tax. The intent of 
such a tax is to (as the effect of all taxes) lower the produced amount of goods to a level 
where nature can absorb the byproducts without harm (Nicholson, 2005: 593-594). Another 
way to regulate the market is the now well known creation of tradable pollution rights though 
the important notion to understand is that these both result in the same equilibrium (ibid.). 
Whether a firm pays a tax or a royalty in order to pollute does not matter, the output reducing 
effect will still be the same.  
 
How to distribute such pollution rights has come to be a source of great discussion. As 
previously written, there have been a number of discussions as to how this allocation is to be 
made, though it has been shown that the initial distribution is irrelevant to the market. If the 
rights are well defined and do not include any transfer costs, the trade will end up in the most 
effective equilibrium (ibid.). The reason for this is bargaining. Even though a firm would 
gain from being allocated as many rights as possible initially, there is an incentive that these 
will be set to use where they are the most valued. Even if one firm would be given all rights, 
using the excess rights would effectively increase cost (ibid.); the firm would therefore gain 
more from selling the rights not needed instead of using them. The incentive to a firm which 
has not been given any rights is quite simply that without them they would not be able to 
pollute at all i.e. stop production. There is thus a gain for both producers to coexist. This is 
referred to as the Coase theorem.  
 
The theory of negative externalities is at the center the global warming dilemma. As shown 
above, there is a need for regulation to effectively include social cost. It is the choice of 
regulation that has been the greatest source of discussions. Also, the Coase theorem plays a 
certain role in the determination of allocation principles, which will be analyzed further on. 
3.2 Comparative advantage 
Comparative advantage is one of the fundamental reasons to why nations engage in 
international trade. The fact that there are differences in prerequisites between countries 
opens up the possibility of specialization i.e. efficiency in production. As the name states, 
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 this is a relative measurement where at least two countries enjoys different advantages in 
productions when compared. Trade arises between the two when one country can produce a 
good more effectively i.e. to a lower cost than the other. Such differences can be constituted 
by different variables; the most common in economic literature being differences in land, 
labor and capital. The first model that dealt with comparative advantage, by David Ricardo, 
used only the division of labor (Costinot, 2009: 255). This pointed out that even though a 
country has a higher output capacity over another country in, at least, two traded goods, they 
can still reap profit from trade due to differences in labor productivity. The theory of 
comparative advantage evolved further when Heckscher-Ohlin introduced the possibility of 
multiple production factors. This theory explored the advantages in abundance of such 
production factors as land and capital. If a country is relatively abundant in land it will be 
more productive in the production of land-intensive goods (Krugman and Wells, 2005: 412).  
 
The Ricardian and Heckscher-Ohlin models are the classic theories that constitute the base of 
the concept. The modern international economic research though has taken into account other 
factors when assessing comparative advantages. One of these is the disparities in 
technological progress (Costinot, 2009: 255). This means that the technological progress also 
plays a certain role as a determinant of specialization. The higher the technological progress 
a country inhabits, the higher the complexity in production is observed. A similar role is 
played by institutional quality and level of human capital. Some theories even claim that 
technological specialization is dependant on the character of the market. A liberal market 
economy (such as the US) is specialized as radical innovation while a coordinated market 
economy (such as Germany) is focused on incremental innovation (Akkermans et al, 2009: 
181). For environmental economic theory another variable that has been shown to act as a 
comparative advantage is regulation of pollution. It has been shown that countries can 
specialize in lowering environmental compliance cost to specifically attract polluting 
industries thus holding a comparative advantage in such production (Das, 2009: 470). 
Countries that engage in such race-to-the-bottom policy implementation are known as 
pollution havens.  
 
Even though some of the modern takes on the theory of comparative advantage have been 
very well discussed and criticized the fact that new factors have been taken into account 
implies that the case of comparative advantage is far more complex in its determinants than 
previously thought. Whenever there are differences in factors that have implications to 
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 production there is the possibility of comparative advantages in trade, given that other factors 
are held constant. The question of this thesis is unorthodox in the way that the comparative 
advantage in trading emission allowances arises by being efficient in pollution intensive 
production leaving allowances to spare, and not in the production of allowances itself. This is 
therefore really a study in the abundance of pollution reducing industries that causes a 
comparative advantage in trade.  
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 4 Empirical analysis 
This chapter is the center of study. It will present the chosen measurements and results 
needed to give a comprehensive answer to the question. Firstly the hypothesis will be 
revisited to offer an understanding to the chosen measurements followed by a brief review of 
the methodology used. After this, the empirical measurements and results will be analyzed. 
4.1 Returning to the Hypothesis 
It is the hypothesis of this thesis that Sweden is a comparatively advantageous country in 
trading emission allowances. Since allowances are not produced per se the measurement of 
comparative advantage is a country where emission reductions in GHG abundant production 
industries are efficient. 
 
The hypothesis is based on the notion that Sweden is a country that is well known for its 
environmentally sound policies and technological progressive climate in green markets. For 
example, a well known fact is that fossil fuelled energy sources such as coal based energy 
production are basically non-existent in Sweden. The main sources for energy are instead 
nuclear-, hydro- and wind generated. Also, in the heating of houses Sweden has in a large 
extent switched from electric to locally produced heating by using forestry- and household 
waste products. Public transportation is another sector that in many parts of Sweden has been 
switched from gasoline to other more environmentally friendly substitutes such as biogas, 
ethanol and other alternatives (Kaemer, 2008). It is therefore thought that Swedish industries 
to a larger extent have switched to green technology thus being more emission efficient in 
GHG abundant productions. This would imply that Sweden is comparatively advantageous. 
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 4.2 Methodology 
In order to determine if Sweden has a comparative advantage in trading emission allowances 
a number of variables will be analyzed. It is first of all necessary to establish if the 
prerequisites for such an assumption exist. This is done by analyzing Swedish emissions 
compared to the allocation and allocation principles of the allowances. Furthermore, the 
future competitiveness of sectors is also analyzed to give a comprehensive picture as to 
whether this is case or not. These factors will then be used in context to actual trade flows to 
establish if an advantage exists. 
 
The main choice of methodology is the quantification of the problem. Since the question is 
characterized by a large statistical population, where both trade and emission are of the 
quantitative sort, there is a need for this method. The main material measured in this thesis is 
the trade data collected from the Nord Pool exchange and analyzed first hand. The other 
measurements of the question are more diverse since there are many aspects to the dilemma. 
The quantified data used to analyze this part is however not processed first hand but is 
mainly relied on statistical compilations by the European Environmental Agency (EEA), 
previous articles and the Swedish EPA.  
 
However, to say that this thesis is solely based on quantifiable measures would be incorrect. 
The measurements of the question are mainly quantitative but the analysis of how these relate 
to each other and the evaluation of the results are qualitative. More over this, some 
qualitative measures are used to present a comprehensive result. 
4.3 Emissions and targets in Sweden 
As previously stated, Sweden has for a long time been internationally known as an 
environmentally friendly country. This can also be shown in the statistics. Within the 
European Union only two countries emit less greenhouse gases per capita (2007), Romania 
and Latvia. In total emissions Sweden is ranked the 19th biggest emitter (EEA Pivot 
application, 2009).  
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 Carbon dioxide constitutes the largest amount of GHGs, over 98 percent of the total 
emissions (Naturvårdsverket, 2008). The largest sector for emitting CO2 in Sweden is 
transportation. In 2007 this sector alone emitted 20642.37 thousand tonnes of CO2 which 
roughly accounts for 40 percent of the fuel combustion activities. Within this group, road 
transportation accounts for the largest amount. Though being the largest emitting sector in 
Sweden, and a big contributor in other EU countries as well, the transportation sector is not a 
part of the EU ETS yet. Following the transportation sector in size are the energy sectors 
(electricity and heat) and manufacturing industries including construction (ibid.). These 
account for about 20200 thousand tonnes of CO2 and are the main sectors for the allocation 
of allowances in the EU ETS compliance. Because of the reporting date of the statistics 
presented here being in December the following year, the 2007 statistics are the latest 
available, but these numbers give a fair overall view from where Swedish emissions 
originate.  
 
When compared to other industrialized countries the difference in Sweden is quite clear. 
Since Sweden use coal and oil generated energy to a small extent there is a big difference 
with other countries. Combining all industrialized countries, carbon dioxide originating from 
energy production totals closer to 40 per cent (worldbank.org, 2009) compared to Swedish 
production that adds up to roughly 20 per cent (Naturvårdsverket, 2008). Further on, 
transportation amounts to 20 percent and manufacturing and construction to just over 12 
percent (worldbank.org, 2009). When comparing the latter, in Sweden this amounts to about 
20 percent of the total emissions (Naturvårdsverket, 2008). The main productions in the 
industry sector where carbon dioxide is a bi-product is constituted by steel production, 
chemical and the pulp and paper industries (ibid.). The reason for the industry sector being 
relatively larger in Sweden than in other industrialized countries is mainly that it is a relative 
measurement. The exclusion of energy and heat production leaves the industrial sector at just 
under 20 percent in the other industrialized countries as well, but it is also a fact that the main 
Swedish industrial productions are fairly intensive in carbon dioxide emissions.  
 
Sweden has been a part of the EU ETS system since the beginning in 2005. During this time 
Swedish companies have been allocated allowances for the emissions they are projected to 
release. It is important to understand that these allowances are allocated to a specific 
installation which means that they are not allocated to a particular company as much as it is 
allocated to a specific country. This means that a company that resides in country A but emits 
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 greenhouse gases by operating an installation in country B receives allowances from country 
B. This is an important notion that is needed to bear in mind further on.  
 
Presented below is a diagram showing the Swedish compliance to the EU ETS (EEA pivot 
application, 2009-10-06). The four sets of bars indicate the four years 2005 – 2008. Each set 
includes three measurements that together paint a good picture of the compliance to the EU 
ETS. The left light blue bar represents the amount of allocated allowances. The brown bar in 
the middle gives the amount of surrendered allowances. This is the bar that needs to cover 
the annual total amount of emissions represented by the darker blue bar on the right. 
 
Fig. 4.1 - Swedish emissions with surrendered and allocated allowances in 2005-2008 
 
During the 4 years 2005-2008 Swedish emissions by sectors in the EU ETS increased 
slightly. In 2005 the total amount of emissions to be included was 19382 thousand tonnes of 
carbon dioxide and equivalent. During the four years studied this amount increased with 625 
thousand tonnes which equals to a 3.2 percent increase (EEA Pivot application, 2009). 
Disregarding 2007 when the Swedish emissions were lower than they were in the initial year, 
the total emissions have steadily increased until 2008 to a total of 20007 thousand tonnes in 
2008 (ibid).  
 
The amount of surrendered allowances in Sweden has covered the emissions in three of the 
four years. What this measurement says is how many allowances that have been either used 
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 to cover emissions made or which have expired. Expiration occurs because every allowance 
issued inherits a period of usage. The reason is to constantly control the amount of 
allowances in circulation; it also reduces the likelihood of speculation. Expiration can also 
occur between phases as it did in between the first and the second phase 2007 – 2008. In 
2005 Swedish installations surrendered allowances to the exact amount of emissions made, 
19382 thousand. The following year there was a surrender deficit of about 1000 thousand 
allowances. About a third of these can be explained by a registry malfunction in the company 
EC Nordkap (ec.europa.eu, 2007), but the rest are installations that did not cover all of their 
emissions thus being penalized for their transgression. In the third year there was a 1200 
thousand EUA surplus in surrendered allowances (EEA Pivot application, 2009). The reason 
for this can to a large extent be explained by the expiration period. Since the allowances 
issued in the first phase were not transferrable to the second these automatically expired 
requiring their owners to surrender them within four months (European Parliament, 2003). 
Another explanation is that all emissions need to be covered, even previous transgressions. 
The uncovered emissions in 2006, though being fined, were still needed to be covered, 
consequently showing up in the next period. A surplus, albeit smaller than previous years, 
can also be observed in the last year. In total Swedish installations managed to match 
emissions with allowances surrendered three out of four years. 
 
The last variable in the diagram above is perhaps the most interesting for this thesis; the 
amount of emission allowances that were allocated to Swedish installations. In combination 
with the amount of allowances surrendered and the amount of emissions made, it is possible 
to calculate the surplus or deficit in the amount of allowances used. This shows if Swedish 
installations have sold excess or bought additional allowances.  
 
The first noticeable observation of the diagram above shows that in all four years of the EU 
ETS, Swedish installations have received more allowances than both emissions needing 
coverage and the surrendered amount. Another observation easily made is that the surplus in 
allocated allowances is bigger in the first phase 2005 – 2007 than in the second 2008. There 
are two reasons for this also explained earlier. The first being that both emissions and 
surrendered allowances have increased during the observed period and the second is the 
decrease in allowances allocated in the second phase. The reason for the emissions to 
increase though is the inclusion of previously exempted industries (Berggren PM, 2009). The 
total emissions excluding these installations actually decreased (ibid.). 
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In 2005 Swedish installations were given 22289 thousand EUA allowances to cover the 
19382 thousand tonnes GHG emissions made which leaves a surplus of 2907 thousand 
allowances (EEA Pivot application, 2009). This surplus increased in 2006 when the allocated 
amount was raised slightly to 22484 thousand and the surrendered amount decreased to 
18875, consequently leaving a surplus of 3609 thousand allowances. Further on, in 2007 the 
surplus decreased to 2645 even though the allocated amount increased to 22846 thousand 
(EEA Pivot application, 2009). Also, as explained previously, the reason for this is that the 
surrendered amount of allowances increased due to the downturn in the price of EUAs. The 
allocation decreased in 2008 due to the restrictions in emission targets when the EU lowered 
the central cap. The amount allocated in 2008 was 20775 thousand and once again, compared 
to the amount of surrendered allowances these resulted in a surplus of 674 thousand 
allowances. This means that Swedish installations have in total, during these four years, out 
performed the targets by a total of 9835 thousand EUA allowances. This is a quite large 
allowance surplus leaving a potential of almost ten million EUAs to be sold at market price. 
Once again, since it is an important notion, this surplus comprises the installations physically 
located in Sweden, not companies and institutions from Sweden.  
 
When summarizing the Swedish emissions statistics above some concluding remarks can be 
made. The main carbon dioxide polluting sectors in Sweden is transportation, industry and 
energy. The main difference when comparing to other industrial states is that the Swedish 
energy sector emits far less carbon dioxide. The reason for this is the Swedish main use of 
non-carbon dioxide abundant technologies such as nuclear-, hydro- and wind powered 
sources. When analyzing statistics in the Swedish compliance to the EU ETS system it is 
clear that Swedish installations have increased the use of GHGs, though new inclusions 
played a certain role. Comparing 2005 levels with 2008 levels there has been a 3.2 percent 
increase in the sectors covered by the EU ETS (EEA Pivot application, 2009). This statistic 
also shows that Sweden in all four years has been over allocated in allowances and has 
received more allowances than has been surrendered as well. This over allocation has 
resulted in a surplus total of roughly 10 million allowances. Since we know from the 
statistics that these have not been surrendered and since this would also be the case if they 
were expired, the excess allowances are probably sold to be used in other installations.  
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 4.4 Sweden’s national allocation plans 
The reason for analyzing the Swedish allocation plans is that these plans reflect the active 
policies of what industries to push towards emission reductions. As with differences in 
marginal cost of pollution between countries, differences in allocation across industries can 
imply differences emission reducing incentive. 
 
As every EU ETS country, Sweden submits a national allocation plan (NAPs) to the EU 
commission for approval. This plan is based on the EPA projections and a set of allocation 
principles to determine which installation gets what quantity of allowances in the hand out 
process. These plans are based on annual allocations but are only submitted preceding a new 
phase. The allocation principles are set out by the government environmental department, 
confirmed by Riksdagen (the Swedish parliament) and practically set to use by the Swedish 
EPA. As the EU ETS is currently in the second phase, two national allocation plans have 
been made. 
 
The first phase allocation plan stated that Sweden needed a total of 68.7 million emission 
allowances to cover emissions. This amounted to a total of 22.9 mission allowances allocated 
every year (Regeringskansliet, 2004). This amount was also cleared by the EU Commission 
without revisions (European Union, 2005). In reality the emissions amounted to an average 
of 19.3 million tonnes of carbon dioxide a year (EEA Pivot application, 2009). The reason 
for this 19 percent over allocation can be derived from the allocation reports leading up to the 
NAP. When assessed for the NAP these reports were thought conservative in numbers 
resulting in an added buffer for possible increases in emissions and new entrants, which 
resulted in an over allocation. When entering the NAP for the second phase Sweden 
requested 25.2 million allowances annually. 22.2 million of these were to be allocated to 
existing installations leaving 3 million to eventual new entrants (Regeringskansliet, 2006). 
This was a significant increase to the previously allocated 22.9 million. The second 
allocation plan though was not accepted by the EU Commission and after revising the plan 
the national cap was set to 22.8 million allowances annually (European Union, 2007).  
 
The principles for the distribution of allowances in the two phases were conducted by 
introducing an economic model. The reason for implementing such equations was to fulfil 
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 the prerequisites of simplicity, transparency, predictability and non-bureaucracy 
(Regeringskansliet, 2004:16). These prerequisites were given by the EU commission in order 
to assure the NAPs objectivity and fairness in the allocation of allowances. These equations, 
presented below, were used, though slightly differing, for both NAPs and it determined how 
many allowances were to be given to a specific installation. 
 
Existing installations –  Allocation05-07 = k (E98-01 x Kex) + ER05-07 
 
New entrants –  Allocation05-07 = k x Projected output05-07 x BM/BAT 
 
The equations made a clear division of the industries into two groups, raw material related 
emissions and fuel-related emissions by the variable k. The first group included industries 
dealing with refinements of materials where carbon dioxide is bound, or the use of carbon 
dioxide to rid unwanted components. The second group includes industries that uses fossil 
fuel to produce power, heating or transport energy (ibid). The variable k assumes 0.8 if the 
installation is an energy sector combustion (the second group) and 1.0 if it isn’t (the first 
group). The variables within the parenthesis, E98-01 x Kex, are the annual emission mean 98 -
01 multiplied with a correction if extraordinary events took place within those years. Lastly, 
the variable ER05-07 gives the eventual supplements in projections for 2005 – 07.  
 
The second equation, applied to new entrants, is basically the same as the first but instead of 
relying on previous emissions a projection of future emissions combined with a benchmark 
of the most efficient producer was used to determine the amount to allocate 
(Regeringskansliet, 2004:34). 
 
The principles for allocation in the second phase were similar to the equation in the first 
phase with some changes. The equations above stayed relatively the same; the biggest 
difference being the calculation of the electricity and heating sector. In the second phase 
these were given allowances on a “what is left”-basis, after the allocations to all other 
industries was done. This sector was not considered a priority in the allocation. The model 
above was later revised due to the lowered cap by the EU commission though the basics of 
the equation were still used. However, the electricity and regional heating installations were 
now exempted allowance allocation (ibid.), the reason being that these sectors, especially 
regional heating, were evaluated as not as competitively challenged as other sectors 
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 (Interveiw - Berggren, Sara, 2009). Another motive for this position was a directive by the 
Riksdag to act more restrictive in the existing energy sector (Regeringskansliet, 2007). 
Exempted from this position were the new entrants to the scheme where the electricity and 
regional heating sectors in this case were allocated allowances by a benchmarking evaluation 
(naturvardsverket.se, 2009).  
 
It is therefore safe to say that there has been an agenda to restrict the energy market further in 
emissions. 
4.5 Competitive advantage 
The market for EUAs in the trading scheme is fairly different from a regular market because 
of different productions in both end product and in factors used. This makes comparing 
competitiveness in the emissions market different from other market.  
 
Since it isn’t really the EUAs that are the main product in this market, it is GHGs, companies 
want to produce as little as possible in order to avoid the additional cost of EUAs, thus if the 
market as a whole finds itself in a large amount of supply the demand actually diminishes. 
This is the short term perspective because of the price; big quantities in the market equal low 
prices leaving the GHG reduction incentive less attractive, thus the need for continual 
allowance reductions in the cap. The competitive advantage in this market is therefore also 
peculiar to measure. The competitiveness results in the notion that whoever can produce their 
products with the lowest amount of GHGs possible i.e. the most EUAs to spare are 
competitive in emission reduction. In turn, since emission reductions lower costs, the 
production itself also becomes more competitive.  
 
Since firms that trade emission allowances aren’t a homogenous group in the production, in 
order to compare competitiveness there is a need to differentiate the sectors of production. 
These are in turn to be compared in between countries; Sweden being the main country of 
interest. This means that not only competitiveness is being studied but also comparative 
advantage. This kind of study has been made by Peterson and Klepper (2008) which will be 
shown here. 
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The introduction of the EU ETS had explicit effects on the competitiveness for the industries 
included. In general, these policies had a negative effect on competitiveness in the EU as a 
whole because of reductions in production which led to fewer exports. These effects are 
however small and the damage has not been severe (Peterson and Klepper, 2008). Generally, 
it’s mostly the energy intensive sectors that are most affected, though the export decrease in 
highly energy intensive sectors was compensated by increased competitiveness in other 
manufacturing industries (ibid.). 
 
Sweden inhabits a fairly big industrial sector which includes the production of iron, steel, 
paper and pulp, minerals and chemicals. These are all energy intensive productions that 
usually mean a large amount of bi-products such as greenhouse gases. The entire industry 
sector in Sweden emitted about 10 million tonnes of carbon dioxide and other GHGs in 2007 
(Naturvårdsverket, 2008). The production sectors mentioned above constitutes about half of 
that. It can also be noted that these are large scale productions in output. The main sector 
where Swedish production is relatively green is the mentioned production of electricity and 
heating. The main reason is that electricity production does not use any coal or oil and a large 
amount of the production in heating uses forestry waste or similar green technology. 
 
In evaluating future competitiveness for Sweden and in which sectors these can be observed 
two things are to be taken into account. How competitive a sector in a specific country is now 
and how well these sectors have adopted new technology allowing them to avoid large costs 
in excess allowance purchasing. 
 
The closest measured geographic subset to such data is Scandinavia (Sweden, Finland and 
Denmark) which roughly gives the same picture as Sweden, although it is important to be 
critical if these were to show unexpected results. Presented below is part of the Scandinavian 
result of a study in such future competitiveness (ibid.).  
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Fig. 4.2 - Future sector competitiveness in Scandinavia (Petersson and Klepper, 2008) 
 
The diagram above shows the competitiveness for Scandinavian sectors in the EU ETS until 
2020. The diagram is divided into 10 subgroups by sector in the x-axis and the y-axis gives 
the relative measurement in competitiveness ranging from +1 to -1. A positive fallout 
indicates a sector as competitive when compared to other countries or regions and vice versa. 
There are also three subgroups for every sector which gives the three measurements of the 
study. RTB stands for relative trade balance and is an indication of the reaction of the trade 
balance relative to total trade (ibid.). RCA is the revealed comparative advantage which 
measures the relative competitiveness across different industries within the same economy 
(ibid.). Lastly, RWS stands for the relative world share. This measurement shows the share of 
the sector exports relative to total exports, this is then compared to the same share 
internationally (ibid.). These three measurements give a balanced view of the expected future 
competitiveness. 
 
Not surprisingly, the sectors where the Scandinavian countries will perform poorly are in the 
fossil fuels sectors, crude oil (CRU), gas and oil. The reason for this is quite simply that no 
Scandinavian country (expect Norway that isn’t included here) is abundant in fossil fuel. 
When observing the electricity production (EGW) it is possible to conclude that this is a 
competitive market in the future. The main reason being the high share of renewable and 
nuclear energy previously mentioned (Petersson and Klepper, 2008). Due to the use of such 
sources in energy production in Scandinavia, as with the abundance of nuclear power in 
France, these regions can actually increase profits in entering the EU ETS (ibid.). The 
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 diagram above shows this sector to be the second most competitive in the relative world 
share measurement (RWS). The two Scandinavian sectors that best manage being 
competitive, are the Paper and pulp production (PPP) and transportation sector (MOB). The 
reason for the paper and pulp production being such a competitive sector in Scandinavia is 
the relative abundance in forestry and the large, robust industry within the sector. This 
industry is mainly located in Sweden and Finland, which is why it’s safe to say that this is a 
competitive industry in Sweden. The other competitive sector is commercial transportation 
which can be considered peculiar. The transportation sector is the largest emitter in carbon 
dioxide in Sweden. In 2007 this sector emitted 20 million tonnes of carbon dioxide which 
amounts close to 40 percent of the total emissions in Sweden (Naturvårdsverket, 2008). The 
reason for Scandinavian transportation being competitive is the fact that it isn’t included in 
the EU-ETS yet. When transportation is included the cost of carbon dioxide emissions will 
effectively decrease because the emission costs in Sweden for non-ETS sectors are among 
the highest in the EU (Petersson and Klepper, 2008). This is why they are competitive when 
including the ETS as a factor. 
 
The statistics above shows that Swedish and Scandinavian sectors will be competitive over 
the next ten years. This is the case for all industries except for the fossil fuel sectors where it 
is shown that the Scandinavian countries are not competitive, as was expected. 
4.6 Trade data 
The trade data that is the basis for this part of the thesis comprises the Nord Pool exchange 
trade in EUA and CER allowances. The material includes a number of variables such as 
markets, countries and periods. The data was retrieved directly from Nord Pools statistical 
department and is therefore considered to be very reliable. Nord Pool is the second largest 
market place for trading emission allowances (uk.reuters.com, 2008), by itself it constitutes 
about 10 percent of the total market in both the spot market and in futures. Nord Pool is also 
an especially interesting market when studying Sweden since this market place is used 
frequently by the Nordic countries and is geographically placed in Oslo, Norway 
(nordpool.com, 2009). Nord Pool started out, in 1996, as an elspot market place and shortly 
became the leading spot price provider to the power market. The market has carried emission 
allowances since 2005.  
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 The data is divided into monthly entries starting in January 2005 and ending in December 
2008. The reason for studying this specific time period is that EUAs became a tradable 
commodity in 2005. It ends in December 2008 to avoid eventual offsets in monthly or 
seasonal trends. Every entry is counted in the volume of trade for a specific month. One 
quantity in the data means one contract traded and in turn one contract equals 1000 metric 
tonnes of emissions. Since, as previously said, one unit of EUA or CER allowance is the 
equivalent to one tonne of GHGs allowed to be emitted this means that one contract equals 
1000 EUAs or CERs.  
 
There are two kinds of markets in the data, exchange and ‘over the counter’ (OTC). The 
exchange is the market where Nord Pool is the intermediary between companies and the 
OTC is where Nord Pool facilitates contacts between companies to trade directly with each 
other.  The OTC market is by comparison about three times bigger than the exchange in the 
selected period. In total world trade OTC constitutes about 50 percent. The data also divides 
the turnover into buy- contracts and sell- contracts, this measure is also known as double 
counted (DC). Using this variable makes it possible to easily count the net-trade for a specific 
country over the 48 (four years) periods.  
 
The main tool used for analyzing the data is Microsoft Excel. The reason for using this 
program is that the analysis is not very complicated. To observe the net trade in a time series 
doesn’t demand a more statistically advanced program. 
 
The unrefined data is compiled into trade originating countries, where the country is the 
compilation of trading firms originating from that country. This means that countries that 
aren’t included in the EU ETS can also take part in the data because of installations in the EU 
belonging to firms originating from non EU countries such as the United States of America 
and the Cayman islands. This means that a firm originating from one country but with a 
GHG emitting plant in another country will in the trade data be filed under the country of 
origin and not the country of the emission. Since trade in marketplaces is surrounded by 
confidentiality it is not possible to obtain quantities traded by a specific firm or transfer. 
 
The data contains the total trade by all the countries in the Nord Pool market during the time 
period. As trade demands a buyer and a seller the posts, as previously said, includes the total 
quantity bought and sold for every period and for every country. Theoretically this means 
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 that the total trade (Σ bought – Σ sold) in the market should total to 0 which is also the case. 
This is a fairly obvious but important notion to point out because if this would not be the case 
the material would be proven incomplete, thus less reliable for the study. Further on, the 
quantities traded are analyzed both in total and in division by OTC and exchange. Also, since 
CERs and EUAs are equally valued they are summed in the total trade measurements but for 
the trade graph that includes price, the EUAs are analyzed separately.  
 
In order to reduce the material into one graph the measured value is the net trade quantity of 
sales minus the quantity of bought allowances for every period. This means that a positive 
quantity for a specific period shows that Sweden has sold more emission allowances than 
was bought that month, and vice versa. 
 
Because price is an important factor of trade, this is a necessary variable to account for. 
These statistics were also retrieved from Nord Pool directly. Since the price data differed 
from the quantity data in the interval of measure (daily instead of monthly) these were fitted 
to the trade data simply by calculating the average price for every month. Since no extreme 
short term price fluctuations were observed this method was considered to be fair.  
 
Presented below are the figures compiled by the data. By presenting these in a series of 
aspects a complete picture of the Swedish trade in emission allowances at the Nord Pool 
market will be shown. 
4.6.1 The Swedish total net trade 
The diagram below shows the Swedish total trade in quantities between 2005 and 2008. At 
first glance it can easily be observed that the curve fluctuates quite frequently up and down. 
This can be explained by differences in reporting periods. Since a firm doesn’t need to carry 
the needed amount of allowances at all times, but only in the reporting periods, it means that 
companies don’t purchase the allowances needed until necessary or when the price is right.  
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 Swedish total trade
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Fig. 4.3 - Total Swedish net trade in quantity 
 
This figure also includes a linear equation. It is added to show the trend over time and gives 
an indication in what direction the country is headed. The equation for this line is specified as 
y = -7.2901x + 125.97, this tells us that for every period that goes by, Swedish firms buy 
roughly 7.3 more contracts than the previous period. The second parameter in the equation is 
the intercept which tells us what the net trade was when the trading commenced. The value 
125.97 then tells us that Sweden was a net exporter of emission allowances in the beginning 
of the EU ETS system. Taking into account the x-variable this also tells us that about 18 
periods into the scheme this changed and Sweden became a net importer of emission 
allowances.  
 
In order to determine if the negative relationship shown above is specific for either the 
exchange or the OTC trade these are presented separately below. These show that, though 
there is a significantly steeper net trade in the exchange market and that the intersection with 
the x-axis occurs earlier than in the OTC trade, the negative relationship and the intersection 
is shared between the two. 
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 Swedish trade - OTC
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Swedish trade - Exchange
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Fig 4.3.1 a and b - Swedish total net trade in quantity, division by market Exchange and OTC 
 
It is a quite intriguing notion in the figures above, that Sweden as a country, over time, shows 
a negative net trade balance. This is interesting to this thesis because it in fact implies that the 
hypothesis, that Sweden is comparatively advantageous in trading emission allowances, 
might be incorrect. In order to conclusively determine if this is the case variations of the data 
must be analyzed. 
4.6.2 The price mechanisms and trade 
An interesting variable that could play a central role for the trade data is the price of emission 
allowances. Since variations in the price could cause substantial difference in the amount of 
allowances bought and sold it is important to also reflect this variable. As previously stated, 
the pricing has been a source of great criticism as to the functionality of the system, making it 
especially interesting to account for.  
 
The diagram below shows the price curve of emission allowances during 2005 until 2008. As 
is clearly shown, the price varies a great deal over time, the most extreme variation being the 
great dip during 2007. This dip was the result of the over allocation in the first phase of the 
EU ETS (uk.reuters.com, 2007). The price was though fairly stable during the two preceding 
years. It was when the excess supply of allowances was discovered that the price almost 
immediately started to fall. In just a year, the price fell from just over € 26 to under € 1. In 
2008 the price rose again with a spectacular increase, the reason being that it was not allowed 
to bank emission allowances between the second and first phase. Therefore, only phase two 
allowances, which were valued much higher, could be bought. 
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Fig. 4.4 – EUA price in Euro 
 
Because of these rather substantial variations in the pricing of allowances this will be 
included in the analysis of the Swedish trade. To show the effect of the price dynamics the 
Swedish buy and sell quantities are below presented separately. It is clear that when price is 
 between periods can be quite extreme.  not a factor, as in 2007, the variations in trade in
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Fig. 4.4.1 a and b – Swedish turnover in quantities sold and bought 
 
as inevitable due to the 
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Even though the great price dip was not intentional in any way it w
e
the national allocation plans it has be shown that this was to be expected (Peterson and 
Klepper, 2008:12). The price was not to reach € 1 in the first phase when modeling future 
prices. What is more interesting in studies of this kind is the price for the second period and 
onwards. These show that the price will rise to just under € 5 for the second phase and not 
rise higher until the third phase in 2013, € 10. After that, the price will gradually be growing 
for every year to come (ibid.). 
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 The next diagram shows the Swedish trade including the price of EUAs. This diagram is not 
entirely based on the net quantities as previously mentioned (fig. 4.3) because the prices only 
comprise EUAs and not CERs. That is why the diagram below disregards the trade with 
CERs. However, the vast majority of trade in the Nord Pool market is conducted in EUAs. 
The diagram below though doesn’t expose any major differences compared to the ones 
previously presented. 
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Fig. 4.5 – Total Swedish net trade in value (price included) 
 
ade it is clear that this alters the 
ata quite a bit, especially during 2007 when the prices were at a record low. The inclusion 
4.6.3 Additional measurements 
 
 include CERs, only EUAs, for the purpose of 
cluding the variable of price. This makes it all the more interesting to also measure the 
When compiling the price statistics with the Swedish net tr
d
of prices doesn’t show any change in the negatively sloping curve, the equation for this linear 
regression function being y = -100.01x + 2287. This implies the same conclusion as was 
previously stated. The equation shows that Sweden in the first part of the scheme went from 
being a net exporter to becoming a net importer of emission allowances. The equation also 
states that for every period that passes, Sweden loses 100.01 thousand Euros worth of 
emission allowance net trade.  
As mentioned above the latest diagram did not
in
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 trade in CERs in order to determine if there is any significant difference in the trade flow 
between the allowances. Two aspects must be noted before further comparing these data with 
the previous EUA data. The trade in CERs does not constitute as much trade as the EUAs, 
this means that the trade data is more vulnerable to temporary differences in trade. The 
second notion is that this commodity has not been tradable for as long time as EUAs in the 
Nord Pool market. These were first traded in August of 2007.  
Swedish trade in CERs
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Fig. 4.6 – Swedish CER net trade in quantity 
 
gate trade and the trade in EUAs, it is possible 
 observe the two mentioned notions in the diagram above. It is rather simple to observe that 
 that the hypothesis is incorrect. Sweden has a negative net trade in 
mission allowances. Measured in absolute numbers Sweden has, during 2005 – 2008, a net 
Before making any comparisons to the aggre
to
the trade didn’t begin until August 2007 in the time series the other one being harder to spot. 
There are two main characteristics that indicate a sporadic trade in CER allowances, the swift 
changes in the net trade and five points of zero-trade. When comparing the data for the EUA 
and CER allowances it is quite clear that these both follow the same negative linear 
relationship. However, the point where the line intersects the x-axis occurs later (March 
2008) in the CER data. Another observation that points to the correlation between these is 
center proximity to zero. 
 
It is now conclusive to say
e
purchase of allowances amounting to 2072 contracts (2,072 million EUAs) worth € 5318.14 
thousand in the Nord Pool market alone. In analyzing the diagrams above the negative slope 
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 seems quite steep, but it shall be stated that even though the balance between bought and sold 
allowances over time is negative, the curve is fairly centered on 0. The notion that especially 
proves the hypothesis of this thesis to be untrue in the Nord Pool market is the fact that 
Sweden went from being a net exporter to becoming a net importer. A fictive negative 
sloping curve that doesn’t break the x-axis can still imply the hypothesis to be true.  
4.6.4 Validity discussion on trade statistics 
esis aim  by using aggregate statistical 
easurements. But, and this is a big but, the trade data above is unfortunately flawed. In 
not only GHG 
mitting companies that trade emission allowances. Even though anyone is free to buy these 
hough there are 
hortcomings in the data, corporations don’t always use proxies as stated above. When they 
 
This th s to quantify the trade with allowances
m
measuring trade as done above, the data inherits these shortcomings. The reliability of the 
statistics is of good quality being collected from the direct source. It is the validity that 
suffers flaws. There are two main reasons for this. The first reason is that the data only 
covers the Nord Pool exchange and not all Swedish trade including over the counter (OTC) 
trade. The reason for not including trade quantities from other exchange marketplaces is quite 
simply that these have not agreed to share their data due to confidentiality. Three other 
exchanges have been asked, ECX, EEX and Bluenext. All of these declined for this reason. 
The Swedish authority of energy, that keeps registry of allowances in Sweden, has also been 
contacted but declined because of the lack of tools to extract the wanted data.  
 
The second reason for the data to suffer flaws is the origin of the trade. It is 
e
allowances it is first and foremost broker firms and banks causing alterations in the data. 
Corporations trading allowances can use these kinds of intermediaries to close a deal. This 
makes it impossible to know what company is behind the trade let alone their origin by the 
data above. These show up in the data under the intermediary corporation origin. At the Nord 
Pool exchange these kinds of intermediaries are used in 20 – 40 percent of the total turnover 
in trade depending on monthly variations (Interview - Voss, Fredrik, 2009). 
 
Does this mean that the data above is useless? Fortunately not! Even t
s
buy EUAs and CERs individually the data is correct, which is 60 – 80 percent of the time. 
The other part of the validity problem is the size of the market. Since this thesis deals with 
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 the net trade, as long as corporations do not specifically and continually buy their allowances 
in one marketplace and sell at another, there is no reason to believe that the Nord Pool 
aggregate data would differ extensively from other markets. The main reason for this is that 
the prices in the markets are the same because of price transparency in free markets. Another 
reason to imply this condition is that the entire market is very sizable and 10 percent of the 
entire market gives a fairly good picture of trade flows. It can also be noted that the Nordic 
countries are especially active in this specific marketplace. 
 
This being said, the data above will not present an exact compilation of the trade and is 
erefore not valid enough to make a statistically safe conclusion, though it gives an th
implication of the trade flow. To further chart the trade it is suggested in further research to 
more extensively examine trade by gathering better data, if possible. 
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 5 Discussion 
The discussion will lead up to the final conclusions of this thesis. The chapter will discuss the 
results of the empirical analysis presented in the previous chapter by applying it to the 
question and the hypothesis.  
 
This discussion will begin by assessing whether Sweden shows the needed prerequisites to be 
advantageous in trading allowances or not. Next, the trade statistics will be discussed as 
opposed to the prerequisites and lastly these will be summed up by possible explanations.  
 
Sweden is one of the EU’s least emitting nations per capita, the emissions included in the EU 
ETS totals to 22846 thousand tonnes (2007). Out of these, the electricity and heating- and 
industry sector constituted 20200 thousand tonnes of GHG emissions, the energy sector 
versus the industry sectors accounts for roughly 10 million each. The largest sector by 
international measurements is by far the electricity and heating sector which accounts for 
roughly 40 percent in industrialized countries. The reason for this being the largest sector is 
that the most commonly used source of energy is still fossil fuel. This is not the case in 
Sweden where the same sector constitutes just about 20 percent. This is mainly because 
Swedish production of electricity includes just a marginal amount of GHG emissions, two 
percent. The rest is mostly emitted by the heating sector such as regional heating.  
 
When comparing Swedish emissions with allocated and surrendered allowances it is clear 
that Swedish installations emit much less GHGs than allowed. During the first four years of 
the EU ETS there has not been a single year that Swedish firms have surrendered more 
allowances than has been allocated. This means that Swedish emissions have been well 
within the limits for what has been allowed. Over the four years studied there has been an 
excess of allowances amounting to almost 10 million. This would imply that Sweden is a net 
provider in emission allowances given that firms behave rational under the cap and trade 
mechanisms. Though an observation that can be made is that Swedish firms (in the 
compliance to the EU ETS) tend to emit more emissions for every year, 2007 excluded; there 
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 was an increase of 3.2 percent during 2005-2008. This is partly because some new industries 
were included in the second phase. As the allocation of allowances was decreased in 2008, 
when entering the second phase, this net excess has also decreased over the four years.  
 
Further on, the allocation principles in Sweden were analyzed because these play a certain 
role in the incentive to reduce emissions. By allocating a firm more allowances than needed, 
the incentives to reduce emissions are not as strong as if they were to be under allocated. By 
applying the Coase theorem there is something to be said of the allocation. The given 
allowances will eventually end up in the efficient equilibrium, how ever the initial 
distribution was made. This means that trade will exist until the equilibrium is reached. 
However, this is not to say that there aren’t differences in incentives due to allocation. When 
allocating the allowances Swedish authorities first and foremost distributed these to the 
industry-sector. The energy sector was, especially in the second phase, allocated much less 
allowances. Therefore, the policy incentive to reduce emissions was to a greater degree 
ordered through the energy sector. This was also the intent of the Swedish authorities. 
 
When assessing the competitiveness in different industries it is also shown in the empirical 
analysis that Sweden has an advantage in most sectors. The main industries where Sweden 
does not have an advantage is in industries that deal with fossil fuel such as crude oil, natural 
gas and refined oil. The reason for this is that Sweden is not abundant in these sectors nor is 
it sectors that Swedish industries specialize in. But in sectors like electricity, paper and pulp 
and transportation Sweden is expected to be competitive also in the future when including the 
economic impact of the EU ETS. It is mainly the changeover to renewable energy sources 
that imply competitiveness in the electricity sector. But the sector that is shown to be most 
competitive is the paper and pulp sector. This is a sector that Sweden is abundant in when 
assessing the resources, however the statistics shows it to be efficient also in the EU ETS. 
 
To sum up, it would appear that Sweden holds the prerequisites to being a comparatively 
advantageous country in trading emission allowances, though hard to measure exactly to 
what degree. It is shown that Sweden is not dependant on fossil fuel to any large extent. 
Mainly the energy sectors are very efficient in the exclusion of GHG emissions when 
compared internationally. This is also shown by the fact that Sweden has preformed well 
under the limits for emissions under the first four EU ETS years, leaving emission 
allowances to spare every year. Combined with the fact that Swedish industries on a sector 
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 level is shown to be competitive when including the regulations of the EU ETS shows that 
prerequisites facing Swedish industries imply the country as being comparatively 
advantageous, thus proving the hypothesis.  
 
The other measurement to the question is the Swedish trade data. The existence of a 
comparative advantage would assumingly show a positive net trade. What this would say is 
that Sweden is comparatively advantageous because it can produce products at such emission 
efficient levels that the allocated allowances are not fully needed.  
 
The trade data presented in the previous chapter instead states a different relationship. Based 
on this data alone, Sweden is not comparatively advantageous. The data has been analyzed in 
aggregate numbers of quantity, in division of market type, by the inclusion of price and CERs 
separated. There were two main findings all of these measurements had in common. They all 
showed a negative linear relationship and they all crossed the zero net quantity line (x-axis).  
 
The first finding showed that Sweden loses net trade in the Nord Pool market for every 
trading period that passes at a rate of 7300 allowances and 100 000 Euros in EUAs alone. 
This can possibly be explained by the increase in emissions in the EU ETS complying 
industries combined with the stricter cap when allocating allowances for the second phase. It 
is when observing the trade data including the price it becomes clear that it is in the second 
phase this loss is clearly negative in net trade. The second finding though is perhaps more 
interesting. This explicitly states that Sweden has gone from being a net exporter to a net 
importer of emission allowances. Even though the negative relationship itself would not have 
to contradict Sweden as being a comparatively advantageous country the fact that the trade 
data shows that Sweden has gone from being a net exporter to net importer is implication 
enough that this is not the case. The interesting question now is why this is not the case 
considering the previous finding? 
 
This is a harder question to answer by analyzing the empirical material presented earlier. 
Some uncertainties to the data were considered in the 4.6.4 validity discussion, though it is 
more likely that another variable plays a role in possibly altering the statistics. There was an 
initial discrepancy in the definition of Sweden that might have played a role in the data. The 
trade data comprises Swedish firms trading at the Nord Pool exchange and the emissions are 
measured by installations physically located in Sweden. The reason for this to be included as 
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 a possible offsetting variable is that there are some Swedish companies that engage in GHG 
emitting productions in other EU countries i.e. trading allowances as a Swedish firm but 
emitting in another country. These firms would be allocated allowances by the country where 
the emissions take place because of the installation based distribution but trading as a Swedish 
labeled firm. A good example of this is the energy company Vattenfall that only uses non 
GHG emitting energy sources in Sweden such as hydro, nuclear and wind, (vattenfall.se, 
2009) but fossil fuel generated electricity, mainly in Germany, accounts to just over 46 
percent of the total production (vattenfall.com, 2009). Since Vattenfall is registered in 
Sweden the company is labeled as Swedish in the Nord Pool data. This is one, rather good, 
example of the possible explanation to the difference. 
 
If this analysis is correct, that Sweden holds the prerequisites of being a comparatively 
advantageous country but the statistics imply otherwise, there is a rather interesting 
implication to be made by this study. Swedish firms act differently in Sweden as opposed to 
abroad when engaging in GHG emitting productions. 
 
To conclude the discussion; it has been shown that Sweden has been successful in the switch 
to emission efficient production technology by analyzing the GHG abundant industries in 
Sweden. It has also been shown that most sectors, when including the EU ETS as a factor, 
are competitive internationally which further supports the notion that a “green” production 
changeover has been made. This change as it seems, when assessing the NAPs, has also been 
an active governmental policy. This can be shown by analyzing allocation to actual emissions 
and surrendered emission allowances. This would imply that Sweden holds a comparative 
advantage in trading emission allowances. However, the trade data suggests otherwise. This 
suggests that Sweden as a country is not advantageous and that it is a net importer of 
emission allowances. It is therefore inconclusive to say whether Sweden is comparatively 
advantageous or not. 
 
On a side note, even though it is not what this thesis was set out to do, the variables presented 
in the empirical analysis quite clearly shows that there was an over allocation in the first 
phase and that the effect of this was a collapse in the price. The fairly non-critical attitude 
towards the NAPs in allocation and the subsequent result of a vast amount of unused 
allowances contrasted to the price makes it clear by the measurements of this thesis that the 
cap was not efficiently set. This resulted in an actual increase in emissions. 
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 6 Conclusions 
It has been the objective of this thesis to establish whether Sweden holds a comparative 
advantage in trading emission allowances or not. By analyzing emissions in division by 
sector, allocated and surrendered allowances, allocation principles, the competitiveness of 
Swedish firms and finally the actual trade, this study has comprehensively tried to answer 
this question. The working hypothesis was that such an advantage existed and that the chosen 
measurements would reveal this.  
 
The analysis of Swedish GHG emitting industries showed that the origins of emissions differ 
from other industrialized countries. Mainly the energy sector accounts for a smaller portion 
compared internationally. The big reason being the almost non-existing fossil fuelled 
electricity production in Sweden. This is otherwise one of the single largest EU ETS 
complying sectors. Also, the national allocation plans for Sweden explicitly shows that there 
is an active policy to reduce emissions in the energy sector. When comparing the total 
emissions over the four years (2005-2008) to the allocated and surrendered allowances, 
Swedish firms, though narrowing, performed well under the limitations leaving a total excess 
of 10 million EUAs. Combined with the notion that Swedish sectors, excluding fossil fuel 
sectors, has been shown competitive when including the EU ETS as a factor, this suggested 
that the hypothesis was true. 
 
By analyzing the actual trade in emission allowances by processing trade data collected from 
Nord Pool, this suggestion though became more uncertain. When measuring this data in a 
number of ways, the central being total quantity and total value (including price) net trade 
(sell – buy), these share two common characteristics, a negative linear relationship over time 
and the turn from being a net exporter to a net importer of allowances. Though facing some 
difficulties with the validity of the data the reason for these characteristics is rather the 
discrepancy in the definition of Sweden. The trade data, compared to the definition in the 
previous data, additionally includes Swedish companies owned installations abroad. Given 
the previous data suggesting another outcome this would imply that Swedish firms act 
differently in GHG emitting production domestically from abroad.  
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To answer the question of this thesis, if Sweden is comparatively advantageous in trading 
emission allowances, it cannot conclusively be stated whether this is the case or not. The 
thesis shows that the prerequisites for such an assumption would lead to believe that this is 
the case but when observing the actual trade data the results become contradictory. A 
satisfying answer to the question can therefore unfortunately not be made. 
6.1 Suggestions for further research 
This thesis was unsuccessful in the attempt to answer whether Sweden holds a comparative 
advantage in trading emission allowances or not. The main reason for this was the 
inconsistencies in the data. It was initially thought that the Nord Pool data would give a 
comprehensive picture of Swedish trade flows but discrepancies in definitions and other 
measurement difficulties presented an uncertain outcome. Though hard to obtain, it is 
suggested that better suited data is used for future studies of this kind.  
 
An interesting implication though could be made. Based on the discrepancy, mentioned 
above, it was implied that Swedish firms as it seems would behave in a more polluting 
manner abroad than domestically. To conclusively determine if this is the case, it is 
suggested that more studies be made in the subject. However, the implication itself is 
interesting. 
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